Of the Mode of Terminating Disputes Between Nations§ 323. General direction on this subject.§ 324. Every nation is bound to give satisfaction respecting the just complaints of another.§ 325. How nations may abandon their rights and just complaints.§ 326. Means suggested by the law of nature, for§ 327. 2. Compromise.§ 328. 3. Mediation.§ 329. 4. Arbitration.§ 330. Conferences and congresses.§ 331. Distinction to be made between evident and doubtful cases.§ 332. Of essential rights, and those of less importance.§ 333. How we acquire a right of having recourse to force in a doubtful cause.§ 334. and even without attempting other measures.§ 335. Voluntary law of nations on this subject.§ 336. Equitable conditions to be offered.§ 337. Possessor's right in doubtful cases.§ 338. How reparation of an injury is to be sought.§ 339. Retaliation.§ 340. Various modes of punishing, without having recourse to arms. § 341. Retortion.§ 342. Reprisals.§ 343. What is required to render them lawful.§ 344. Upon what effects are reprisals made.§ 345. The state ought to compensate those who suffer by reprisals. § 346. The sovereign alone can§ 347. Reprisals against a nation for actions of its subjects, and in favor of the injured subjects.§ 348. But not in favor of foreigners.§ 349. Those who have given cause for reprisals ought to indemnify those who suffer by them.§ 350. What may be deemed a refusal to do justice.§ 351. Subjects arrested by way of reprisals.§ 352. Our right against those who oppose reprisals.§ 353. Just reprisals do not afford a just cause for war.§ 354. How we ought to confine ourselves to reprisals, or at length proceed to hostilities. 1. In 1724.
2. In 1728.
3. When, in the year 1355, they submitted their differences with the dukes of Austria, in relation to the countries of Zug and Glaris, to the arbitration of Charles IV., it was not without this preliminary condition, that the emperor would not touch the liberty of those countries, nor their alliance with the other cantons. Tschudi, p. 429, etc Stettler, p. 77. History of the Helvetic Confederacy, by De Watteville, book iv. at the beginning.
4. "Nam, ut Plato alt, nemo prudens punit quia peccatum est sed, ne peccctur." Seneca, de Ira.
5. On the subject of reprisals, it is necessary to observe, that when we adopt that expedient, as being a gentler mode of proceeding than that of war, the reprisals ought not to be general. The grand pensionary De Witt very properly remarked, " I do not see any difference between general reprisals and open war."
6. On that subject, the grand pensionary De Witt wrote as follows: "Nothing can be more absurd than that grant of reprisals: for, to say nothing of its proceeding from a board of admiralty, who have no power to grant it without infringing on the sovereign authority of their prince, it is evident that no sovereign can grant or make reprisals, except for the defense or indemnification of his own subjects, whom he is, in the sight of God, bound to protect; but he never can grant reprisals in favor of any foreigner who is not under his protection, and with whose sovereign he has not any engagement to that effect, ex pacto vel fdere, Besides, it is certain that reprisals ought not to be granted except in case of an open denial of justice. Finally, it is also evident, that, even in case of a denial of justice, he cannot empower his subjects to make reprisals, until he has repeatedly demanded justice for them, and added, that, in the event of a refusal, he will be obliged to grant them letters of marque and reprisal." From the answers of M. Boreel, it appears that this conduct of the British admiralty was strongly condemned by the court of France. The king of England testified his disapprobation of it, and gave orders for the release of the Dutch vessels whose seizure had been permitted by the way of reprisal. Edit. 1797.
7. See Bynkershoek's Competent Judge of Embassadors, chap. xvii.
8.Audpoynia, seizure of men.
9. Demosthenes, Orat. adv. Aristocrat
10. Grotius De Jure Belli et Pacis, lib. iii. cap. ii § 6.
11. See Book III. chap. iv.