de Vattel: Of the Interpretation of Treaties

The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law (1758)Emmerich de Vattel

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Of the Interpretation of Treaties§ 262. Necessity of establishing rules of interpretation.§ 263. 1st general maxim: it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation.§ 264. 2d general maxim: if he who could and ought to have explained himself has not done it, it is to his own detriment.§ 265. 3d general maxim: neither of the contracting parties has a right to interpret the treaty according to his own fancy.§ 266. 4th general maxim: what is sufficiently declared, is to be taken for true.§ 267. We ought to attend rather to the words of the person promising, than to§ 268. 5th general maxim: the interpretation ought to be made according to certain rules.§ 269. The faith of treaties lays an obligation to follow these rules. § 270. General rule of interpretation.§ 271. The terms are to be explained conformably to common usage.§ 272. Interpretation of ancient treaties.§ 273. Of quibbles on words.§ 274. A rule on this subject.§ 275. Mental reservations.§ 276. Interpretation of technical terms.§ 277. Of terms whose signification admits of degrees.§ 278. Of figurative expressions.§ 279. Of equivocal expressions.§ 280. The rule for these two cases.§ 281. Not necessary to give a term the same sense everywhere in the same deed.§ 282. We ought to reject every interpretation that leads to an absurdity.§ 283. And that which renders the act null and inefficient§ 284. Obscure expressions interpreted by others more clear in the same author.§ 285. Interpretation founded on the connection of the discourse.§ 286. Interpretation drawn from the connection and relation of the things themselves.§ 287. Interpretation founded on the reason of the deed.§ 288. Where many reasons have concurred to determine the will.§ 289. What constitutes a sufficient reason for an act of the will. § 290. Extensive interpretation founded on the reason of the act.§ 291. Frauds tending to elude laws or promises.§ 292. Restrictive interpretation.§ 293. Its use, in order to avoid falling into absurdities, or into what is unlawful.§ 294. Or what is too severe and burdensome.§ 295. How it ought to restrict the signification agreeably to the subject.§ 296. How a change happening in the state of things may form an exception.§ 297. Interpretation of a deed in unforeseen cases.§ 298. reasons arising from the possibility, and not the existence of a thing.§ 299. Expressions.§ 300. Of things favorable, and things odious.§ 301. What tends to the common advantage, and to equality, is favorable; the contrary is odious.§ 302. What is useful to human society, is favorable; the contrary is odious.§ 303. Whatever contains a penalty, is odious.§ 304. Whatever renders a deed void is odious.§ 305. Whatever tends to change the present state of things. is odious; the§ 306. Things of a mixed nature.§ 307. Interpretation of favorable things.§ 308. Interpretation of odious things.§ 309. Examples.§ 310. How we ought to interpret deeds of pure liberality.§ 311. Collision of laws or treaties.§ 312. First rule in cases of collusion.§ 313. 2d Rule.§ 314. 3d Rule.§ 315. 4th Rule.§ 316. 5th Rule.§ 317. 6th Rule.§ 318. 7th Rule.§ 319. 8th Rule.§ 320. 9th Rule.§ 321. 10th Rule.§ 322. General remark on the manner of observing all the preceding rules.
   1. Standum omnino est iis, quæ verbis expressis, quorum manifestus est significatus, indicata fuerunt, nisi omnem a negotiis humanis certitudinem removere volueris. Wolf. Jus. Nat. par vii. n. 822.
   2. Digest, lib. ii. tit. xiv. de Pactis, leg. 39. — See likewise Digest, lib. xviii, tit. i. de Contrahenda Emptione, leg. 21, Labeo scripsit obscuriratem pactinocere potius debere venditori qui id dixerit, quam emptori; quia potait re integra apertius dicere.
   3. History of Queen Elizabeth.
   4. See Pufendorf's Law of Nature and Nations, book v. chap. xii. § 3. La Croix in his Hist. of Timurbec, book v. chap. xv. speaks of this cruelty of Timurbec, or Tamerlane, towards 4000 Armenian horse men, but says nothing of the perfidy which others attribute to him.
   5. Fraus enim adstringit, nen dissolvit perjurium. De Offic. lib. iii chap. xxxii.
   6. The French expression, "oudir une frame." which is rendered "hatch a plot," literally signifies, "to lay the warp of a web;" — "fire and sword," literally, "fire and steel," (or iron).
   7. Pufendorf, lib. v. cap. xii. § 7.
   8. Lib. iv. cap. xcviii.
   9. Digest, lib. i. tit. iii. De Legibus, leg. 24.
   10. Quid? verbis satis hoc cautum erat? Minime. Quæ res igitur valuit? Voluntas: quæ si, tactis nobis, intelligi posset, verbis omnino non ute emur. Quia non potest, verba reperta sunt, non quæ impedirent, sed quæ indicarent voluntatem. Cicer. Orat pro Cæcina.
   11. Pufendorf, lib. v. cap. xii, § 18. He quotes Ammianus Marcellinus, lib. xxii. cap. xvi.
   12. Puffend. ibid, Herodotus, lib. vi. Five drachmae amounted to little more than three shillings sterling.
   13. Tacit. Annal. lib. v. 9.
   14. Lib. iv. Declam. xxvii.
   15. Digest, lib. xxvi. tit, iii De Confirm Tutor leg. 10
   16. See Barbeyrac's remarks on Grotius and Pufendorf.
   17. Quintillian, Instit. Orat. lib. vii. cap. iv.
   18. Orat. pro Cæcina, cap. xxiii.
   19. Digest. lib. xliii. tit. xvi. De Vi et Vi Armata, legg. 1 et 3.
   20. Lib. ii. cap. xvl. § 13.
   21. Aurovouos Appian. de Bello Punico.
   22. Such is the decision of the Roman law. — Javolenus says: "Beneficium imperatoris quam plenissime interpretari debemus;" and he gives this reason for it: "quod a divina ejus indulgentia proficiscatur." — Digest, lib. i. tit. iv. de Constit. Princ. leg. 3.
   23. The prohibitory law creates, in that particular instance, an exception to the injunctive law. "Deinde utra lex jubeat, utra vetet. Nam sæpe ea quæ vetat, quasi exceptione quadam, corrigere videtur illam quæ jubet." — Cicero, de Inventione, lib. ii. 145.
   24. Jus Gent. lib. v. cap. xii. § 23.
   25. "Primum igitur leges oportet contendere, considerando utra lex ad majores, hoc est, ad utiliores, ad honestiores, ac magis necessarias res pertineat. Ex quo conflictur ut, si legee duæ, aut si plures, aut quotquot erunt, conservari non possint quia discrepent inter se, ea maxime conservanda putetur, quæ ad maximas res pertinere videatur." Cicero, ubi supra.
   26. This is also the reason which Cicero gives: "Nam maxime conservanda est ca quæ diligentissime sancta est." Cicero, ubi supra.