293. The papers in the Federalist, on the subject of the judiciary of the United States, are, in general, equal to any that will be found in that publication. See vol. 1. p. 140, and vol. 2, p. 290, &c.
294. C. U. S. Art. 2. Sec. 2. Art. 3. Sec. 1.
295. C. U. S. Att. 3. Sec. 2.
296.Centinel, p. 15.
297. See 3 Blacks. Com. p. 41, 55.
298. Amendments to C. U. S. Art. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
299. The several conventions of Massachussetts, New Hampshire, Rhode-Island, New York, Virginia, and North Carolina, proposed amendments in this respect.
300. Massachussetts, Virginia, and Georgia, were sued by individuals in the federal courts.
301. By the constitution of the United States, "no money can be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law. How shall an individual having a judgment against the United States, in his favour, recover his money, if the legislature chuse to keep him out of it? The case seems to be equally as bad in the state governments.
302. 3 Cess 43. Edw. 3. — 3 Inst. 117. The barons of the exchequer were the only judges in Engl and, who, at the time Sir Edward Coke wrote, held their office during good behaviour, or for life. The student will likewise find the import of these words solemnly argued and decided, by that great man Lord Chief Justice Holt, and his associates; 1 Shower's Reports, 426, 506, to 536, 557.Their judgment was affirmed in parliament. Shower's Cases in Parliament, 158.
303. 1 Blacks. Com. 229. 1 Inst. 110. 3 Inst. 125.
304. Much is it to be regretted that a similar conduct towards the judges of the courts of the United States, has not prevailed in the federal government. Already have we seen two chief justices of the United States, whose duties cannot, certainly, be performed in foreign parts, appointed envoys to distant nations, and still holding their offices in the supreme court of the federal government; offices altogether incompatible, yet held at the same time in manifest violation of every constitutional principle. For surely nothing is more incompatible with the nature of the federal government, than to suppose an office of such high trust and responsibility to have been intended as a sine cure; much less that it could have been intended as the means of extending executive influence, or of shielding the president against the effect of an impeachment. For what could more effectually strengthen the hands of an usurping president, than the power of sending into an honourable exile, the very officer whom the constitution expressly requires to preside at his trial, in case of his impeachment? To preserve the lustre of judicial purity, perfectly unsullied, it seems necessary, by an express amendment of the constitution, to disqualify the federal judges from appointment to any other than a judicial office; since such appointments have a natural tendency to excite hopes, and secure compliance, from the prospect or expectation of additional emolument, accumulated honours,
or greater pre-eminence of station.
305. On the trial of Mr. Thomas Cooper, in the federal circuit court in Pennsylvania, for a libel against the president of the United States, under the sedition law, it is said, that Mr. Cooper applied to the court for a subpoena to summon the president as a witness in his behalf, and that the court refused to grant one. Upon what principle the application was refused, (notwithstanding this article) I have never been able to obtain satisfactory information. The case was certainly delicate, and might have been perplexing.
306. See C. U. S. Art. 3. Art. 1. §. 9. Amendments to C. U. S. Art. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
307.Federalist, vol. 2 No. 78.
308. See the act of 7 Cong. repealing the act of the preceeding congress for the more convenient organization of the courts of the United States, and the debates thereon.
309. L. U. S. 1 Cong. 1 Sess. c. 20. Sect. 13. In the case of Mr. Ravara the Genoese consul, who pleaded to the jurisdiction of the circuit court, the court overruled his plea. Wilson and Peters judges, contra Iredel judge, who was for sustaining it. 2. Dallas's Reports, 297.
