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1. Milton was of this opinion; and triumphantly states, that "all ingenious and knowing men will easily agree with me, that a free commonwealth, without a single person or house of lords, is by far the best government, if it can be had." (Milton on the Ready and Easy Way to establish a Free Commonwealth.) His notion was, that the whole power of the government should centre in a house of commons. - Locke was in favour of a concentration of the whole executive and legislative powers in a small assembly; and Hume thought the executive powers safely lodged with a hundred senators. Mr. Chancellor Kent has made some just reflections upon these extraordinary opinions in [his Commentaries].
2. Propositions were made in the convention, for an executive composed of a plurality of persons. They came from that party in the convention, which was understood to be favourable to a continuation of the confederation with amendments.
3. The learned commentator on Blackstone's Commentaries was of opinion, that an executive composed of a single delegate of each state, like the "committee of congress" under the confederation, would have been better, than a single chief magistrate for the Union. If such a scheme had prevailed, we should have had at this time an executive magistracy of twenty-four persons. Surely the experience of the country, under the confederation, must have been wholly forgotten, when this scheme approved itself to the judgment of the proposer. Mr. Jefferson has told us in an emphatic manner, that the "committee of congress immediately fell into schisms and dissensions, which became at length so inveterate, as to render all cooperation among them impracticable. They dissolved themselves, abandoning the helm of government; and it continued without a head, until congress met, in the ensuing winter. This was then imputed to the temper of two or three individuals. But the wise ascribed it to the nature of man."
4. Mr. Chancellor Kent has, in his Commentaries, condensed the whole pith of the argument into two paragraphs of great brevity and clearness.
5. Mr. Jefferson says, "The executive in our governments is not the sole, it. is scarcely the principal object of my jealousy. The tyranny of the legislatures is the moat formidable dread at present, and will be for many years. That of the Executive will come in its turn; but it will be at a remote period."
6. This plan, whatever may now be thought of its value, was at the time supported by some, of the purest patriots. Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Jay were among the number. Mr. Hamilton, (it seems) at a subsequent period of the convention, changed his opinion on account of the increased danger to the public tranquillity, incident to the election of a magistrate to this degree of permanency. Possibly, the same change may have occurred in the opinions of others.
7. Doctor Paley has condemned all elective monarchies, and, indeed, all elective chief magistrates. "The confession of every writer on the subject of civil government," says be, "the experience of ages, the example of Poland, and of the Papal Dominions, seem to place this amongst the few indubitable maxims, Which,the science of government admits of. A crown is too splendid a prize to be conferred upon merit. The passions, or interests of the electors, exclude all consideration of the qualities of the competitors. The same observation holds concerning the appointments to any office, which is attended with a great share of power or emolument. Nothing is gained by a popular choice worth the dissensions, tumults, and interruptions of regular industry, with which it is inseparably attended." Mr. Chancellor Kent has also remarked, that it is a curious fact in European history, that on the first partition of Poland in 1773, when the partitioning powers thought it expedient to foster and confirm all the defects of its wretched government, they sagaciously demanded of the Polish Diet, that the crown should continue elective. America has indulged the proud hope, that she shall avoid every danger of this sort, and escape at once from the evils of an hereditary, and of an elective monarchy. Who, that loves liberty, does not wish success to her efforts?
8. Mr. Senator Hillhouse, in April, 1808, proposed an annual election, among other amendments to the constitution; and defended the proposition in a very elaborate speech. The amendment, however, found no support. The learned editor of Blackstone's Commentaries manifestly thought a more frequent election, than once in four years, desirable.
9. Mr. Jefferson appears to have entertained the opinion strongly, that the chief magistrate ought to be ineligible after one term of office. "Reason and experience tell us," says he, "that the chief magistrate will always be reelected, if he may be reelected. He is then an officer for life. This once observed, it becomes of so much consequence to certain nations to have a friend or a foe at the head of our affairs, that they will interfere with money and with arms, etc. The election of a president of America some years hence will he much more interesting to certain nations of Europe, than ever the election of a king of Poland was." (Letter to Mr. Madison in 1787.) He added in the same letter: "The power of removing every fourth year by the vote of the people is a power, which they will not exercise; and if they were disposed to exercise it, they would not be permitted." How little has this reasoning accorded with the fact!! In the memoir written by him towards the close of his life, he says: "My wish was, that the president should be elected for seven years, and be ineligible afterwards. This term I thought sufficient to enable him, with the concurrence of the legislature, to carry through and establish any system of improvement he should propose for the general good. But. the practice adopted, I think, is better, allowing his continuance for eight years, with a liability to be dropped at half way of the term, making that a period of probation."
10. The committee of the convention reported in favour of a choice by the senate, in case there was none by the people.
11. In addition to these grounds, it has been suggested, that a still greater and more insuperable difficulty against a choice directly by the people, as a single community, was, that such a measure would be an entire consolidation of the government of the country, and an annihilation of the state sovereignties, so far as concerned the organization of the executive department of the Union. This was not to be permitted, or endured; and it would, besides, have destroyed the balance of the Union, and reduced the weight of the slave-holding states to a degree, which they would have deemed altogether inadmissible. It is not perceived, how either of these results could have taken place, unless upon some plan, (which was never proposed,) which should disregard altogether the existence of the states, and take away all representation of the slave population. The choice might have been directly by the people without any such course. And in point of fact, such an objection, as that suggested by Mr. Chancellor Kent, to a choice by the people, does not seem to have occurred to the authors of the Federalist. If the choice had been directly by the people, each state having as many votes for president, as it would be entitled to electors, the result would have been exactly, as it now is. If each state had been entitled to one vote, only, then the state sovereignties would have been completely represented by the people of each state upon an equality. If the choice had been by the people in districts, according to the ratio of representation, then the president would have been chosen by a majority of the people in a majority of the representative districts. There would be no more a consolidation, than there now is in the house of representatives. In neither view could there be any injurious inequality bearing on the Southern states.
12. Mr. Chancellor Kent has summed up the general arguments in favour of an election by electors with great felicity. And the subject of the organization of the executive department is also explained, with much clearness and force, by the learned editor of Blackstone's Commentaries, and by Mr. Rawle in his valuable labours.
13. A practice, which has been censured by some persons, as still more alarming, is the nomination of the president by members of congress at political meetings at Washington; thus, in the mild form of recommendation introducing their votes into the election with all their official influence.
14. Allusion is here especially made to the late Mr. Bayard, who held the vote of Delaware, and who, by his final vote in favour of Mr. Jefferson, decided the election. It was remarked at the time, that in the election of Mr. Jefferson, in 1801, the votes of two or three states were held by persons, who soon afterwards received office from him. The circumstance is spoken of in positive terms by Mr. Bayard, in his celebrated Speech on the Judiciary, in 1802. Mr. Bayard did not make it matter of accusation against Mr. Jefferson, as founded in corrupt bargaining. Nor has any such charge been subsequently made. The fact is here stated merely to show, how peculiarly delicate the exercise of such functions necessarily is; and how difficult it may be, even for the most exalted and pure executive, to escape suspicion or reproach, when he is not chosen directly by the people. Similar suggestions will scarcely ever fail of being made, whenever a distinguished representative obtains office after an election of president, to which he has contributed. The learned editor of Blackstone's Commentaries has spoken with exceeding zeal of the dangers arising from the intrigues and cabals of an election by the house of representatives.
15. Mr. Rawle is of opinion, that the old vice president would, under the old mode, act as president in case of a nonelection of president. I cannot find in the constitution any authority for such a position.
16. If the office should devolve on the speaker, after the congress, for which the last speaker was chosen, had expired, and before the next meeting of congress, it might be a question, who is to serve, and whether the speaker of the house of representatives, then extinct, could be deemed the person intended. 1 Kent's Comm. Lect. 13, p. 260, 261. In order to provide for the exigency of a vacancy in the office of president during the recess of congress, it ha. become usual for the vice-president, a few days before the termination of each session of congress, to retire from the chair of the senate, to enable that body to elect a president pro tempore to be ready to act in any ease of emergency.
17. In the revised draft of the constitution, the clause stood: "And such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or the period for choosing another president arrive;" and the latter words were then altered, so as to read, "until a president shall be elected."