1. Co. Litt. 201. a.
2. Litt. sec. 325.
3. Litt. sec. 378, 380. Co. Litt. 215. b. 233. b. 234. b.
4. Co. Litt. 215. a. 251. b.
5. Glanv. lib. 9. ch. 1. Fleta. lib. 3. ch. 16. Wright on Tenures, 203.
6. Wright on Tenures, p. 196-199. Butler's note 84. to lib. 3. Co. Litt.
7. Fleta, lib. 3. ch. 16. sec. 9. 15. 25.
8. This ancient rule is noticed in the very modern case of Jackson v. Topping, 1 Wendell, 388.
9. Litt. sec. 347, 348. Co. Litt. 215. a.
10. Laws of N.Y. sess. 11. ch. 7. and N.Y. Revised Statutes, vol, i. 747. sec. 23, 24., and by Act of Virginia, November 29, 1792.
11. Co. Litt. 215. a. b.
12. Litt. sec. 325.
13. Lord Hardwicke, in Wigg v. Wigg, 1 Atk. 383. Doe v. Watt, 1 Mann. & Ryl. 694.
14. Litt. sec. 325. 327. Co. Litt. 203. a. Shep. Touch. 157.
15. Co. Litt. 206, 207. Shep. Touch. by Preston, vol. i. 128-130.
16. Ashhurst, J. in 1 Term Rep. 695. Lord Eldon, in 2 Bos. & Pull. 295. Heath, J. ibid. 297.
17. 2 Blacks. Com. 154.
18.Popham v. Bampfield, 1 Venn. 83.
19. 2 Blacks. Com. 156. Preston on Abstracts of Title, vol. ii. 185.
20.Hayden v. Stoughton, 5 Pick. Rep. 528.
21. Co. Litt. 246. b.
22. Perkins, sec. 840. Sh. Touch. by Preston, vol. i. 121. 155.
23.Pells v. Brown, 2 Cro. 591. Holt, Ch. J., Page v. Hayward, 11 Mod. Rep. 61. Lord Hardwicke, in Wigg v. Wigg, 1 Atk, 383. 2 Blacks. Com. 155.
24. Shep. Touch. by Preston, vol. i. 117. Preston on Estates, vol. i. 45. 49. 128, 129.
25. N.Y. Revised Statutes, vol. ii. 505. sec. 30.
26. Co. Litt. 214. b. 218. a. 10 Co. 40. b. 2 Blacks. Com. 155. Preston on Estates, vol. i. 46-48. Shep. Touch. by Preston, vol. i. 121.
27. Butler's note 99. to lib. 3. Co. Litt. Mr. Douglass, in a note to Doug. Rep. 755. thinks the distinction between a conditional limitation, and a remainder, merely verbal; but Mr. Fearne (Fearne on Remainders, p. 10-18.) vindicates the distinction, and relies on the authority of the case of Cogan v. Cogan, Cro. Eliz. 360. Conditional limitations which are contingent remainders, are limited to commence when the first estate is, by its original limitation, to determine; but conditional limitations which are not remainders, are so limited as to be independent of the extent and measure given to the first estate, and are to take effect upon an event which may happen before the regular determination of the first estate, and so rescind it. This is Mr. Fearne's distinction, but he is not clear and fortunate when he comes to illustrate it by examples, and they do appear to be subtly refined, and essentially verbal.
28. Fearne on Remainders, p.10. p. 391-393. 409. 410. In Lady Ann Fry's case, 1 Trent. 199. Sir Matthew Hale said, the point was too clear for argument; and that though the word condition be used, yet limiting a remainder over made it a limitation. The N.Y. Revised Statutes, vol. j. 725. sec, 27. have established and made valid those conditional limitations, whether created by deed or will, and they have thus wisely put an end to the nice and unreasonable distinction in the English books on this point.
29. Co. Litt. 215. a. Pennant's case, 3 Co. 64. Preston on Abstracts of Title, vol. iii. 397. Mr. Preston says, that every limitation which is to vest an interest on a contingency, or upon an event which may, or may not happen, is a conditional limitation. A contingent remainder is a conditional limitation; and estates which have their operation by resulting or springing use, or by executory devise, and are to commence on an event, are all raised by conditional limitations. It is the uncertainty of the happening of the event that distinguishes an absolute limitation from a conditional limitation, or a limitation upon contingency. Though all contingent interests are executory, yet all executory interests are not contingent. Preston on Estates, vol. i. 40, 41. 63. Mr. Preston here confounds conditional and contingent limitations; but Lord Mansfield, in Buckworth v. Thirkell, 3 Bos. & Pull. 247. note. S. C. 1 Col. Jurid. 247. marked the distinction, and said there might be a limitation depending on a contingency without any condition in it.
30. Lect. 53.
31.Poole v. Nedham, Yelv. 149. Baldwin and Cock's case, 1 Lean, 74. Preston on Estates, vol. i. 43, 44. 49, 50.
32. Co. Litt. 205. b. 219. b. 8 Co. 90. b.
33. Co. Litt. 206. a. 208. b. 2 Blacks. Com. 156. Parker, Ch. J. in Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 189. Lord Ch. J. Preby, in Cary v. Bertie, 2 Vern. 339.
34. Dyer, 66. a. p1. 8 Moore, 11. p1. 40.
35.Popham v. Bampfield, 1 Yern. 83.
36.Rolfe v. Harris, 2 Price's Exch. Rep. 207. note. Bracebridge v. Buckley, ibid. 200.
37. l8 Vesey. 56.
38.Mildway's case, 6 Co. 40. Litt. sec. 360. Co. Litt. 208. b. 223, a. Stukeley v. Butler, Hob. 168.
39.Mary Portington's case, 10 Co. 42. a.
40. Co. Litt. 223. a.
41. Litt. Sec. 361. Co. Litt. 223.
42. 2 Caines' Rep. 345.
43. Best, Ch. J. in Doe v. Phillips, 9Moore's Rep. 46.
44. The words usually employed in creating a condition are, upon condition, and this, says Lord Coke, is the most appropriate expression; or the words may be, so that-provided-if it shall happen, etc. The apt words of limitation are, while-so long as-until-during, etc. The words provided always, may, under the circumstances, be taken as a condition, or as a limitation, and sometimes as a covenant. Litt. sec. 325-330. Co. Litt. 203. a. b. Mary Portington's case, 10 Co. 41. b. 42. a. Bacon's Abr. tit. Conditions, H.
45. Litt. sec. 338. Co. Litt. 209. b. Jackson v. Crafts, 18 Johns. Rep. 110. Swett v. Horn, 1 Adam's N. H. Rep. 332.
