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Home - LONANG Library - Hugo Grotius - Law of War and Peace
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BOOK 3, CHAPTER 1General Rules from the Law of Nature Regarding What Is Permissible in War; with a Consideration of Ruses and FalsehoodI. The order of treatment in the discussion which follows.II. The first rule: In war things which are necessary to attain the end in view are permissible. This is explained.III. The second rule: A right is to be viewed as arising not only from the origin of the war but also from causes which subsequently develop.IV. The third rule: Some things, which are not permissible according to the purpose of a war, may follow therefrom without wrong; a precaution is added.V. What is permissible against those who furnish supplies to our enemies is explained through distinctions.VI. Whether it is permissible to use a ruse in war.VII. In a negative action, deceit is not in itself unpermissible.VIII. Deceit in a positive action falls under two heads: deceit exhibited in actions not limited in significance, and that exhibited in actions the significance of which is, as it were, fixed by agreement; it is shown that deceit of the former sort is permissible.IX. The difficulty of the inquiry in respect to the second sort of deceit is indicated.X. Not every use of an expression, which is known to be taken in another sense, is unpermissible.XI. The character of falsehood, in so far as it is unpermissible, consists in its conflict with the right of another; this is explained.XII. The view is maintained that it is permissible to say what is false before infants and insane persons.XIII. It is permissible to say what is false when he to whom the conversation is not addressed is deceived, and when it would be permissible to deceive him if not sharing in it.XIV. It is permissible to say what is false when the conversation is directed to him who wishes to be deceived in this way.XV. It is permissible to say what is false when the speaker makes use of a superior right over one subject to himself.XVI. It is perhaps permissible to say what is false when we are unable in any other way to save the life of an innocent person, or something else of equal importance.XVII. The authors who have judged that falsehood spoken in the presence of enemies is permissible.XVIII. The use of falsehood is not to be extended to statements containing a promise.XIX. The use of falsehood is not to be extended to oaths.XX. Nevertheless it is more noble, and more becoming to Christian simplicity, to refrain from falsehood even toward an enemy; this view is illustrated by comparisons.XXI. It is not permissible for us to force any one to do what is right for us but not for him.XXII. Nevertheless we may make use of assistance voluntarily offered. |
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