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Home - LONANG Library - Hugo Grotius - Law of War and Peace
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BOOK 2, CHAPTER 20On PunishmentsI. Definition and origin of punishmentII. That punishment is related to expletive justice, and in what wayIII. That nature does not determine to whom punishment is due, but that according to the law of nature those free from like offences may exact punishmentIV. That Punishment having in view some advantage must among men be inflicted differently than by God; and whyV. In what sense vengeance may be forbidden by natureVI. The threefold advantage of punishmentVII. Proof that punishment for the good of the wrong-doer may be exacted by any one at all according to the law of natureVIII. Likewise for the good of him who has been wronged, where it concerns vengeance permitted by universal common lawIX. Likewise for the good of the wholeX. What the law of the Gospel has established in this matterXI. The answer to the argument drawn from the mercy of God revealed in the GospelXII. Answer to the argument drawn from the exclusion of repentance.XIII. Rejection of incomplete classifications of punishmentsXIV. It is not safe for Christians, as private citizens, to exact punishment, even when universal common law allows itXV. Neither should Christians of their own accord be too zealous in making accusationsXVI. Nor should Christians seek the office of criminal judgeXVII. The distinction between human laws which confer the right to kill as a punishment and those which merely give impunity for such actionXVIII. Internal acts are not punishable by menXIX. Extrinsic acts which human frailty cannot avoid are not punish able by men.
XX. Acts by which human society is not injured, directly or indirectly, are not punishable by men. The explanation thereofXXI. A refutation of the view that pardon is never permissibleXXII. Proof that pardon is permissible prior to the penal lawXXIII. But pardon is not permissible in all casesXXIV. Proof that pardon is permissible even after the establishment of the penal lawXXV. What intrinsic causes are sufficient to cause the suspension of the lawXXVI. What extrinsic causes are sufficientXXVII. Rejection of the view that there is no just cause to suspend the law, unless it is one that is contained in the law as an implied exceptionXXVIII. The measure of punishment according to what is deserved.
XXIX. A consideration, in this connection, of the causes which lead to, crime, and a comparison of these with one anotherXXX. Also a consideration of the causes that should have restrained from sin; with a discussion of the order of the commandments of the decalogue that apply to one's neighbor, and some other thingsXXXI. Also the inclination of the sinner toward incentives to and deterrents from sinning, which is considered from various points of viewXXXII. The desert of punishment may be extended to include a greater harm than the sinner has actually inflicted. The reasons therefore.
XXXIII. Rejection of the idea of a harmonic proportion in punishments |
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