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Home - LONANG Library - Hugo Grotius - Law of War and Peace
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BOOK 2, CHAPTER 16On InterpretationI. How promises are outwardly bindingII. If other implications are lacking, words are to be understood in their ordinary senseIII. Technical terms are to be explained according to their technical useIV. Resort is to be had to conjectures in the case of ambiguous and contradictory expressions, or if conjectures naturally suggest themselvesV. Conjectures from the subject-matterVI. Conjectures from the effectVII. Conjectures from elements that are connected, either in origin or also in placeVIII. To what the conjecture drawn from reasonable motive applies; and when, and how, it is in pointIX. The distinction between broad and narrow meaningsX. Division of promises into favorable, odious, mixed, and medianXI. The rejection of the distinction between contracts of good faith and those of strict legal right in relation to the acts of peoples and kingsXII. In accordance with the distinctions of meanings and promises stated, rules are formulated in regard to interpretationsXIII. Whether under the term' allies' future allies are included, and in what degree; also, concerning the treaty of the Romans with Hasdrubal, and similar controversiesXIV. In what way the clause, that one people may not make war without the consent of the other, ought to be interpretedXV. Concerning the words, 'Carthage shall be free.'XVI. What compacts are to be considered personal, and what real, is set forth, with distinctions.XVII. That a treaty entered into with a king is continued with him though he may have been expelled from his kingdomXVIII. That such a treaty does not apply to the usurper of a kingdomXIX. To whom a promise is due if it was made to the one who should do something first, and several have done the thing at the same timeXX. A conjecture which presents itself in the one case broadens the meaning; when this occurs.XXI. Herein also concerning the execution of a mandate in a different wayXXII. In the other case the conjecture restricts the meaning; and this may happen by reason of an original defect in the intent, which is inferred from its absurdityXXIII. Conjecture may restrict the meaning by reason of the cessation of the only reasonXXIV. Conjecture may restrict the meaning by reason of a defect in the subject-matterXXV. An observation concerning the conjectures last mentionedXXVI. Or conjecture may restrict the meaning when a case which arises is incompatible with the intent; and this is assumed in regard to what is unlawfulXXVII. Conjecture may restrict the meaning when the condition is too burdensome as regards the actXXVIII. Conjecture may be restricted in view of other indications, as when the parts of a document are in conflictXXIX. What rules ought to be observed in such casesXXX. That in a doubtful case a written document is not required for the validity of a contract.XXXI. The contracts of kings are not to be interpreted according to Roman lawXXXII. Whether the words of the one who accepts the condition, or the words of the one who offers it, ought to carry greater weight, is set forth, with a distinction |
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